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Generative Thinking among Young Zimbabwean Children: A  Case of the
Third Eye
Taruvinga D. Mushoriwa
University o f  Zimbabwe
Abstract .
The present investigation compared the generative thinking o f  second-graders (7-8-year-olds) and 
fifth-graders (10-11-year-olds) in order to see the extent o f  generative thinking among children o f  
different ages. Precisely, the study aimed, to test age trends in children’s generative thinking. 
Participants were 40 second-graders and 40 fifth-graders, randomly Selectedfrom fo u r  schools in 
Harare’s high-density suburbs..The research , design used in this study, was o f  a survey type. 
Interviews were used to collect- data. Crosstabs and a two sample -t-test were used to analyse the data. 
Overall, the study established significant age-related differences iri children’s generative thinking. 
•Fifth-graders were more imaginative I  generative and Showed more sophistication in their reasoning 
than second- graders, who mostly patterned their, ideas on conventions, and thus portrayed limited 
generativity.
Introduction
This study examined and compared .the extent of, and age trends in, the generative 
thinking of second-graders (7-8-year-olds) and fifth-graders (10-11-year-olds) with 
. the ultimate aim of seeing how generative thinking develops in young children. It is 
vital to study the development of generative thinking because it,has been found to be 
a contributor to other cognitive skills such as image formation, story production and 
detecting relationships between phenomena .(Richards and Sanderson, 1999). To 
this effect, children’s generative thinking is clearly an exciting and essential field of 
study. Furthermore, the fact diat the field of generative thinking is an emerging one 
(Feldman, 1999) means that much more should be learned about the development 
of generative thinking in young children.
The Concept of Generative Thinking.
Generative dunking involves the production.of new' and original solutions to 
problems. It could be viewed as active constrtiction'-of a creative instantiation of 
iortie known concept, object or action (Ward and Siforfis, 1997). It allows us to go ot 
interpret, beyotid concrete experiences, focussing on what is possible and not
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necessarily on what is real. Generative thinking, therefore, involves the construction 
and modification of representations that are relevant to some goal (Ward etal, 1997). 
In the current study, the goal was to place the third eye where it could be most useful.
It should be noted that like creativity, generative thinking involves both novelty and 
utility. Since, in this study, subjects were required to imagine being given a third eye 
and to place it on whatever part of the body they felt it should be, novelty involved 
placing an eye outside its usual location (face region), while utility meant usefulness, 
e.g. placing an eye at the back of the head in order to see all round.
Background and Literature Review
Developmental research shows that children are capable of thinking in a variety of 
ways on many tasks and in many diverse fields. For Siegler (1996), the fact that 
children think in a variety of ways and with different results suggests that some 
children are more generative in their thinking than others. Those that are generative 
in their thinking tend to be adaptive to the task environment and to produce novel 
solutions as a result of considering the consequences of alternative approaches to 
their thinking and actions (Siegler, 1996). Thus, generative thinking results in 
solutions that are novel and useful.
Though children’s thinking is essentially generative (Nelson, 1986, Low and Durkin, 
2000), as evidenced by such things as playing- as builders or making car toys, 
research, for example by Ward (1994) and Stokes (1999), indicates that the 
development of generative thinking is gradual, but improves as a function of, among 
other factors, age, IQ, task type, nutrition, family and socio-economic influences 
(Richards and Sanderson, 1999). This shows that the extent of generative thinking in 
children varies from child to child as a function of, among other things, the above 
factors.
In an attempt to establish the extent of generative thinking among students, Ward 
(1994) asked college students to imagine and draw animals that might inhabit a 
planet elsewhere in the galaxy. The observation was that the majority of the students 
lacked imagination to the extent,that they drew earth-like animals. These findings 
seem to suggest that age alone does not necessarily determine the extent of 
generative thinking. In fact, as already seen, children’s generative thinking has been 
found to be influenced by factors such as task specifics, available knowledge and the
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information processing skills, that a child possesses (Runch, 1986). For Stokes 
(1999), children’s generative thinking improves with tasks that are deliberately 
structured to achieve that. Corroborating evidence comes from Harrington (1975), 
who found that instructions aid generative thinking. Harrington (1975) found that 
adult subjects who received task instructions to be creative, produced more creative 
responses than those who did not receive such instructions.
Tamvinga D. Mushoriwa
Runch and Acadia (1991) observed similar results between two groups of 
adolescents. One group received originality instructions, while the other did not. 
Those who received originality instructions obtained higher originality scores than 
those who did not. This suggests that deliberate effort/instruction is necessary if  we 
are to yield superior levels of generative thinking among children.
Other investigators such as Poole and White (1995) have argued that in order to 
foster generative thinking, children should be personally involved. Involving 
children in novel situations is promotive of generative thinking.
It is against such background that the present study was carried out to investigate the 
extent of, and age trends in, children’s generative thinking using a hypothetical 
situation of a third eye.
Methodology
The present investigation was premised on a series of investigations conducted by 
Shafer (1973), where children were asked to deal with hypothetical situations as a 
means of assessing the development and extent of their generative thinking. Thus, 
the present study owes much to palters, for example Shafer (1973), in this field in 
terms of methodological procedures and instrumentation.
Research Design
The research design, because of the nature of the study, was of a survey type. In Van 
Dale’s (1979) view, surveys do not only have the advantage of being used on 
relatively large sampler as is-the case in the current study (N=80), but also.allow the 
collection of detailed descriptions of existing phenomena or trends in order to see 
how they can be improved. To this effect, it was the intention of the present study to
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examine the extent of, and the age trends in, children’s generative thinking in order ■ 
to see how children’s generative thinking could be improved or accelerated.
Sample
Forty second-graders (7-8-year-olds) and forty fifth-graders (10-11-year-olds), 
randomly selected from four schools in Harare’s high density suburbs, participated 
in this study. Second and fifth-graders were involved in order to assess and compare 
the development and extent of generative thinking between the two age groups who, 
according to Inhelder and Piaget, represent a distinct thinking pattern (concrete 
operational thought). However, it should be noted that fifth-graders could already 
be in Piaget’s (1964) formal operational stage (see Mpofu, 1994).
Instruments
Interviews were used to collect data in this study. Interviews were preferred because 
very young children such as second-graders still have problems in writing (as would 
be the case with a questionnaire), let alone giving reasons for their choices in writing. 
This is, perhaps, why Poole and White (1995) argue that one of the many difficulties 
when conducting research with young children lies with the type of task and 
questions asked. In the present study, the task (placing a cardboard eye) and question 
asked (giving reason for placing a third eye in a particular location) took into account 
the numerous problems (e.g. developmentally inappropriate language) encountered 
when conducting research with children.
Children were given cardboard eyes and asked to stick them on any part of their 
bodies where they felt a third eye/extra eye could be, and to give a reason for placing 
it there. Some researchers such as Shafer (1973) have used pictures and asked their 
subjects to simply place a third eye on the pictures while others have asked their 
subjects to draw pictures and then place a. third eye on the pictures drawn. Such 
procedures have been criticised. Studies by Cox (1993) and Freeman (1980) have 
shown that drawing itself is potentially too challenging for many young children, 
worse if  accompanied by the placement of human features such as eyes. The present 
investigation recognised this pitfall (which might result in unreliable and invalid 
results) and opted to use a cardboard eye instead. This also has an advantage because 
research studies such as those by Low and Durkin (1998) have shown that when 
children are asked to use themselves as representations, they tend to place the
176
Tarvvinga D. Mushoriwa \
..human feature in novel situations1 and to provide meaningful reasons which explain 
■how the new feature would improve human functioning as,a whole. The present 
investigator took this advice into account.  ^ . .
Procedures
Participants were interviewed individually so that they would not be influenced by 
others. The interview was conducted in the form of a game. “Let’s play a game. 
Suppose you are given a third eye (showing the cardboard eye), show me by actually 
placing it, where on your body you would like it to be’. The child’s response was 
recorded. Next, the child was-asked to explain or give a reason for placing the eye in 
that location. The response was also recorded.
Coding of Eye Placements
Following the procedures by palters such as Shafer (1973) and Ward (1994), 
participants’ placements of a third eye were recorded as follows:
0 Failure/refusal to respond or to place a third eye on any part of the body.
1 Placing a third eye between the existing/natural eyes.
2 Placing a third eye on the forehead or below the natural eyes, but still within the 
face region.
3 Placing the third eye anywhere else in front - facing region of the body e.g. on 
the chest, stomach, knees etc.
4 Placing a third eye anywhere in the back region of the body e.g. buttock, back of
the head etc. -
Coding of Reasons or Explanations
0 Failure/refusal to explain, or ambiguous explanation.
1 Attributing the placement to mass media e.g. ‘I have seen it on television.’
2 Explanation referring to natural/biological location of ,eyes. e.g. ‘That.is where 
eyes are or should be.’
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3 Explanation referring to how frontal vision would improve if a third eye was in 
that location, e.g. on the forehead: This would allow me to see further ahead.’
4 Explanation focussing on how vision would be improved or more useful if  one 
was able to see all round e.g. third eye being at the back of the head.
All the subjects’ responses were found codable, hence useful. This was mostly so 
because of probing by the investigator.
Having explained the motivation behind the present study as well as its theoretical 
and methodological framework, presentation and analysis of data follows.
Data Presentation and Analysis
Coded data were key-punched for analysis. Two statistics were used. First, crosstabs 
showing percentages of respondents for eye placements and reasons/explanations 
for their placements were used. Second, a two sample t-test was applied to see if 
there were any significant differences in both eye placements and explanations for 
placements between second- and fifth-graders.
Table 1 (a): Crosstab of Eye Placements for Second- (N=40) and 
Fifth-graders (N=40)
E y e  P la c e m e n ts N u m b e r  o f R e sp o n d e n ts
S ec o n d -g ra d e rs F if th -g ra d e rs
1. F a ilu re  o r  refusal to respond 0 (0% ) 0 (0% )
2. P lac in g  the eye betw een  the natu ra l eye 35 (87.5% ) 6 (15% )
3. P lac in g  the eye on  the fo rehead  o r any o th er p art w ith in  the face 'reg io n 1 (87.5% ) 10 (25% )
►4. P lac in g  the th ird  eye  anyw here e lse  in  d ie  front fac in g  reg ion 1 (7.5% ) 1 (2.5% )
5‘, P lac in g  the third eye at the back  reg ion  o f  the bo dy 1 (2.5% ) 23 (57.5% )
.Discussion
Table 1 (a) shows that all the participants responded to item one. This means that all 
. subjects placed a third eye in some place, though, initially, some second-graders were 
unhappy about the idea of a third eye: arguing that it was not necessary at all since
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human beings do not need three eyes. This suggests young children’s inability to deal 
with hypothetical situations (Inhelder and Piaget, 1964). In the Piagetian view, this is 
so because young children have not yet acquired pre-requisite cognitive skills and 
knowledge that would allow them to show reasonable levels of generativity.
Thirty-five (87.5%) second-graders placed a third eye between the two natural eyes, 
while six (15%) fifth-graders placed it between the two natural eyes. Since 
generativity involves novelty (placing the third eye outside the usual place), it means 
that second-graders whose majority (87.5%) placed the third eye within the face 
region have not yet fully developed generative thinking. Only six (15%) fifth-graders 
placed a third eye between the two natural eyes, meaning that the majority placed it 
elsewhere.
Table 1(a) also shows that three (7.5%) second-graders and 10 (25%) fifth-graders 
placed the third eye on die forehead or any other part within the face region. One 
(2.5%) second-grader and one (2.5%) fifth-grader placed a third eye within the - 
front-facing region of the body.
The biggest difference between second- and fifth-graders in their eye placements is 
observed in item 5, where only one (2.5%) second-grader placed the third eye at the 
back of the head, yet this is the crux of the matter. In contrast, 23 (57.5%) 
fifth-graders placed the third eye at the back of die head, indicating a marked 
increase in generative diinking. Not only did fifth-graders show novelty in their 
placements, but also considered utility, for they argued that this would assist in. 
seeing all round.
Overall, what we observe is that while the majority of second-graders (87.5%) placed 
a third eye between the two natural eyes or generally within the face region, the 
majority of fifth-graders (57.5%) placed it at the back of the head. Most 
second-graders argued that it was the face that must ‘contain’ the eyes. On the other 
hand, fifth-graders considered utility (seeing all round), hence they placed it at the 
back of the head. These results are consistent with Shafer’s (1973)observations that 
6-9-year-olds not only lack enough generativity, but are also unable to give adequate 
reasons and explanations for some of their actions because of lack of formal 
operational schemes.
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To see whether the differences between second- and fifth-graders in their 
placements were significant or not, a two-sample t-test was conducted. Below are 
the results.
Table 1 (b): Two Sample t-Test and Confidence Interval for Eye 
Placements for Second Versus Fifth Graders
Alpha Level: 0.05 
N  M ean St Dev SE M ean 
Placement 40 1.150 0.533 0.084
Placement 40 3.02 1.21 0.19
Interpretation
Since p - value = 0.000 < 0.05 and the difference between means (-1-87) lies outside 
the given interval (-2.294;-1.46), we reject the null hypothesis, which states that the 
means of the two groups are the same. This means that the means of the two groups 
are significandy different at the 0.05 significance level.
From the above, it can, therefore, be concluded that there is a significant difference 
in eye placements between second- and fifth-graders. Fifth-graders have a higher 
mean placement score (3.02) than second-graders(1.150), indicating that they 
(fifth-graders) placed the third eye in imaginative locations. For second-graders, 
clearly, there is an age-related limitation in their placements, suggesting limited 
generative thinking at this stage.
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Table 2(a): Crosstab of Reasons/Explanations for Eye Placements for 
Second- and Fifth-graders
R e a s o n / E x p la n a t io n  fo r E y e  P la c e m e n ts N u m b e r  o f  R e sp o n d e n ts
S e c o n d -g r a d e r s F if th -g ra d e rs
1. F a ilure/refusal to  exp la in  o r am biguous explanation 12 (30%} 0 (0% ) -
2  A ttrib u ting  exp lanation  to m ass m ed ia 3 (7.5%} 0 (0%)
3. E xp lanation  re ferring  to natu ra l/b io logica l location 17 (42.5%} 3 (7.5%)
4. E xp lanation  referring  to h o w  fron tal v is ion  w ould  im prove i f  the th ird  eye 
was in  fact in  that location  e.g , fo rehead
7 (17.5% ) 14 (35% )
5. E xp lanation  focussing on ho w  v is ion  w ould  b e im pro ved  or m ore Useful i f  
one w as ab le  to see a ll round ‘ -
1 (2.5% ) 23 (57.5% )
Discussion
Twelve (30%) second-graders failed to give adequate- reasons/explanations for their 
eye placements, while no’ fifth-grader fell within this category. Some of them gave 
answers such as ‘I just felt it was the right place’ or ‘So diat the third eye is near the 
other two eyes’ etc.
While no fifth-grader attributed their explanation to mass media, three (7.5%) 
second-graders attributed explanation to mass media. Answers such as 1 saw people 
with three or more eyes-on TV’ and ‘The TV sometimes shows people with three 
eyes located near each other’ were given. What is interesting about all the answers 
given to items one and two by second-graders so far is that no one is making 
reference to how vision might be improved by having an eye in that location. This 
failure to consider , usefulness or visual advantages indicates limited generative 
thinking; underscoring the fact that generative thinking is a late achievement only 
realised during or towards the formal operational stage. Seventeen (42.5%) 
second-graders and three (7.5%) fifth-graders gave reasons/explanations that have 
to do with biological location of eyes e.g. ‘That is where eyes are found on a person.’ 
Such an answer indicates either failure or hesitation to depart from the known. The 
child does not see or think of how he/she could use a third eye to their advantage, 
such as to see more and better. The high percentage (42.5%) of second-graders and 
the small percentage (7.5%) of fifth-graders falling within this category is further
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testimony to the fact that the development of generative thinking is age-related and, 
hence, hierarchical in nature.
A relatively small percentage (17.5%) of second-graders and a relatively high 
percentage (35%) of fifth-graders gave reasons referring to how frontal vision would 
improve if  the third eye was in a particular location, e.g. on the forehead. The fact 
that more fifth- than second-graders gave this reason shows that fifth-graders, who 
are chronologically more mature, think of utility in both, their placements and 
reasons.
Of great interest in this study is the fact that while only one (2.5%) second -grader 
gave an explanation focussing on how vision would be improved or would be more 
useful if one was able to see all round, 23 (57.5%) fifth-graders gave explanations 
that focussed on how vision would be improved if one was able to see all round, e.g. 
‘So that I could see front and back at the same time.’
The big discrepancy between second- and fifth-graders suggests significant 
differences in generative thinking between the two groups, with fifth-graders 
displaying more instances of generative thinking than second-graders. However, to 
see if  the differences in explanations between the two groups were real/significant 
or not, a two sample t-test was conducted. The results are given in Table 2(b) below.
Table 2 (b): Two Sample T-test and Confidence Interval for 
Reasons/Explanations for Second- versus Fifth-graders
Alpha Level: 0.05 
N M ean St Dev SE Mean 
Explanation 40 1.55 1.18 0.19
Explanation 40 3.50 0.641 1.10
95% C.I for mu explanation - mu explanation: (-2.37, -1.53)




Since p - value = 0.000 < 0.05 and the difference between the two means (-1.95) lies 
outside the given interval (-2.37; -1.53), we reject the null hypothesis which states 
that the means of the two groups are the same. This means that the means of the two 
groups are significandy different at the 0.05 significance level.
We, therefore, can conclude that there is a significant difference in 
reasons/explanations given by second- and fifth-graders. Just like in the eye 
placements, fifth-graders have a higher mean score (3.5) than second-graders (1.55). 
This indicates that there was an increase, as a function of age, in the level of 
sophistication of fifth-graders’ explanations and reasons for where they placed their 
third eyes.
Though the two groups involved in this study were both within Piaget’s (1964) 
concrete operational stage (7-llyear-olds), as already argued, some fifth-graders 
(10-11-year-rolds) could already have attained Piaget’s (1964) formal operational 
thought because, as Mpofu (1994) found out, Zimbabwean school children were 
capable of advanced classification (and perhaps other tasks) at an earlier stage than 
Piaget proposed. If this observation is accepted, then the current findings certainly 
confirm observations by Inhelder and Piaget (1964) that generative thinking is 
mostly achieved during the formal operational stage.
Conclusion
The present study demonstrated significant differences in generative thinking 
between second- and fifth-graders, with the latter showing significantly higher 
placement and explanation mean scores. Most second-graders restricted their eye 
placements to the face region and gave reasons that did not implicate visual 
advantages. On the other hand, most fifth-graders gave creative responses and 
advanced reasons and explanations that implicated visual advantages.
In all, therefore, the current investigation has indicated that children have varied 
responses to creative tasks as a function of, among other factors, age. The different 
age groups responded.differently to the task. It is, therefore, only fair to end up by 
acknowledging the fact that the findings of this study give more credit to Piaget’s 
observations that cognitive development proceeds in stages: with children being
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able to do certain things at particular stages, while at the same time, being incapable 
of other things.
Implications
1. Since the study demonstrated that secorid graders have limited generative 
thinking, there is.need for pedagogy to be attuned to the development of 
generative thinking among pupils. This is'particularly necessary for those children
■ who have not yet attained'formal operational thought (grades 1 to 5); those wHose 
generative thinking may still be limited. Novel hypothetical situations have been 
found to be promotive of generative'thinking (Poole & White, 1995).
2. v Studies by Poole and White (1995) have also1 shown that learning where the child is
personally involved and learning that involves problem-solving accelerates 
generative dunking. The child, because of the natural curiosity to overcome 
challenges, makes an effort to find solutions.by trying out'alternative avenues to 
the solution and, thus, develops creative ideas: •:
3. As already noted, Runch and Acadia (1991) found that of the two groups, the one 
• that received origiriality instructions obtained higher originality scores than’the
group that" did not receive such instructions. This shows that deliberate 
effort/instruction is necessary if  children are to be generative. For example, in the 
present study, a question explicitly asking children to consider where a third eye 
might be placed in order to give superior visual advantage might have produced 
different results altogether. Thus, such intentional manipulations can certainly 
yield superior levels of performance. Hence, educators should structure learning 
episodes in a way that stimulates and encourages generative or resourceful 
thinking. This will help children to be effective problem-solvers.
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